Introduction
The proposal by Fielding, Cavanagh and Widdowson* is that universities should replace the present four-year pre-service teacher training (both end-on and concurrent) with a four-phase scheme requiring five years for the completion of the three pre-service phases.
The first phase comprises three years' study towards a relevant undergraduate degree. The second is one year's internship in a school, under the tutelage of a 'master teacher'. In the third phase, the student returns to his Alma Mater to complete one year's study of the fundamental aspects of educational knowledge. The trainee becomes a fully certified teacher at the completion of this third. phase. The fourth open-ended phase refers to the inservice and continuing education and training of the classroom teacher.
Our particular interest is with the second phase, since this is the most novel aspect of the proposal. If the proposal is to be implemented successfully, it must be acceptable to various parties -the Commonwealth Government as a principal funding agent, the State Governments through their departments of education, the university councils and faculties, and the students themselves. This paper interprets acceptability in terms of the relative magnitudes of the expected financial benefits and costs of the proposed scheme to each of the parties concerned. There are of course other aspects to acceptability besides financial -e.g. political, administrative and organizational. It is left to the reader to weigh up the financial with the various non-financial implications of the scheme, to come to some overall assessment as to whether the scheme should be implemented. .
Our purpose therefore is to explicate the major costs and benefits likely to be perceived by the relevant parties and thus to anticipate the enthusiasm they are likely to exhibit towards the scheme. We could find that while the scheme appears to be worthwhile from a social perspective, one party does not find it so, perhaps because the perceived costs of the extended internship scheme are too high. In such a situation, action might be required to reduce these costs in order for the scheme to appear more acceptable to that party. We thus need to appreciate the nature of the costs which are likely to be incurred and their distribution of burden between the various parties involved. 
The Nature and Distribution of Internship Costs
Trying to assess what are likely to be the costs of an internship scheme and how the burden of these costs is shared, are complex tasks. Let us make two preliminary points.
Firstly, we can view the proposed scheme as essentially to extend the length of a student teacher's practicum by 160 days i.e. from the present required 40 days to 200 days. Nevertheless, the scheme effectively increases the student's whole t~acher education course by a full academic year. The final year, without any practicum, is effectively extended by 40 lecture days.
Secondly, we assume that before the school year commences, interns are given a residential induction course to provide an introduction to school organization and principles of teaching. This will involve the university in outlays on additional lecturing duties and interns on accommodation and materials. Table 1 attempts to summarize the nature and distribution of the costs incurred by a student teacher's involvement in the proposed internship scheme. The format of the table distinguishes between that entity which makes payments and that which actually bears the burden or sacrifice. The distinction lies partly in the funding arrangements for education in Australia. For example, to the extent that the Commonwealth is willing to incorporate the internship program in its funding formulae, the payments made initially by the university, ultimately are translated into a cost burden on the Commonwealth Government.
The table distinguishes between payments made to purchase specific services (actual outlays) and pro rata payments made to those who provide services to the internee as part of their employment. (-called imputed outlays).
The table postulates that there is a further cost involved. Under the internship scheme the student is introduced gradually to the teaching situation, probably spending a good deal of his time in remedial work with small groups of children. At a maximum, he is expected to undertake a half class contact load. Yet as a graduate, he already has done as much tertiary preparation for teaching as those who gain a certificate or diploma of teaching from a College of Advanced Education. An alternative version of the internship scheme could be that the intern be considered as a full classroom teacher(1), under the supervision of a master teacher, and be paid at the 'first step' salary of a two-year trained assistant viz $8,800. Of this, some $1,600 would be paid in Commonwealth income tax, leaving him with $7,200. This income forgone by the intern is largely offset, however, by the scholarship payment to the intern of half the 'first step' salary of a four year trained assistant teacher viz $4,870. In other words the State Government shares some of the cost burden of the intern being held back from full remunerative (1) In England, till recently, university graduates could become 'direct entry' teachers, without preservice training. This service (valued at that of a teacher's aide) is considered an offset to the State's scholarship payment. employment. In return for his scholarship allowance, however, the intern does provide some teaching service to his school-albeit in a subsidiary capacity.
The most noticable feature of the table is that there are considerable differences between the accounted outlays and the economic costs, or sacrifices, of thescheme. The sacrifices required to be made are neither equal to, nor borne by those who make the actual outlays. For example the Commonwealth government is shown to bear the cost burden of the University programme. Moreover the costs exceed the additional grants it makes through the Universities Council, by an amount equal to lost income tax revenue from a full-time teacher. (2) Likewise the student and his family make sacrifices of uncompensated lost earnings, which are nearly twelve times the private course outlays. On the other hand, the cost burden on the State Government is shown to be considerably less than the education department's actual and imputed outlays on the intern, because of the offsetting teaching services given by him.
Cost burdens are more relevant than actual outlays in affecting the likely acceptability of the proposed scheme to the various parties concerned. If a body is confident that all or most of the payments incurred by a decision will be reimbursed by another, cost considerations are unlikely to weigh heavily in the making of that decision.
(2) Note that the payment of a teacher's salary is made by the State government while income taxation is received by the Commonwealth Government.
(a) Master teacher assumed to be paid at full daily rate for professional assistance for 160 days at the daily rate of $5.67 (unsupervised practice, reports not required, for a two-methods student).
(b) Induction course outlays assumed made by university of lecturers and by students on accommodation and related expenses.
(c) Course related outlays refer to required fees, transport and requisites for teaching preparation.
(d) Fielding et al propose that the master teacher be given a time allowance to counsel his intern. The assumed cost is based on one period per week allowed to a master teacher who is also a subject master.
(e) Assumed that the worth of the teaching services of an untrained graduate, teaching his own classes, would be of equivalent worth to a two year trained teacher in first year of teaching. viz. $8,800. Of this, personal disposable income would be approximately $7,200, since $1,600 would be required in income tax. This disposable income forgone is assumed to be offset by the Education Department paying a scholarship to the student of $4,870-half the salary of a four year trained teacher in his first year of teaching. The $2,330 represents the net income forgone of the student.
(f) The intern can be expected to give some teaching services, most of these presumably providing assistance to the master and other teachers. These services are given an assumed value equivalent to a half-time teacher aide ($2,520).
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Conversely, if a body knows that a decision ~i11 entail lo~t ?p~ortunities of considerably greater value than the outlays it mcurs, then I~ IS likely to make decisions which differ significantly from what an observer might expect on the basis of actual outlays alone.
We can summarize our analysis of Table 1 , therefore, by saying that:
(i) the total costs of the proposed internship year exceed by about ten percent, the actual outlays of the year, and (iil the cost burdens are borne roughly evenly between the Commonwealth, State and student's family.
Note that the cost to the State of the whole internship s.che~e will ex.ceed that of the year, to the extent that in the following year It will pay a higher allowance to the student at university, than is paid at present
Note also, that if the State Government does. not grant .the stu.dent a scholarship and he has instead to rely on a Tertiary Education ASSistance Scheme allowance of $3,500, the total cost burden on the family would rise by $1,370 to $3,900, the Commonwealth's burden would increase to $4,087, while the State would be in the net benefit of $1,770.
An Approach to Comparing the Acceptability of Teacher Education Programmes.
Decisions are not made solely on the basis of costs. Even if costs ar~ ~igh: a decision might still be accept~ble if the benefits expected to flow from It JUStify its costs. '
There are a great many tangible and intangible educational benefits whic~ Fielding, Cavanagh and Widdowson (1977) clai~ would flow fror:n their extended teacher education program. Each party will no doubt make ItS own assessments of their validity, relevance and worth. Thes 7 assessm~nts must of necessity be subjective, for there is little ~esearch eV.ldence which could demonstrate and verify the educational benefits they claim.
We have no desire to challenge the reality or importance of the education~1 benefits which the authors claim the program could generate .. Our purp~se IS to narrow the field of debate by taking account of the pecuniary. benefits to the various parties which could flow from the :cheme and by. relatm.g them to the costs we have discussed above. We certamly have no WIS~ to Imply that the financial aspects of the scheme are in any way more or less Important than its educational aspects. Our intention is to 'clear the ground' of debate by demonstrating the possible acceptability or otherwise of the scheme ~o the parties on solely pecuniary grounds. This aspect can then be considered alongside the sundry other aspects when policy decisions a~e being made. If, for example, the expected cultural, social and other benefits are very large, but the private financial returns over costs are me~gre, th~re co~ld be a .case for government acting to lower the costs and / or r~l:e the fmanclal ?e~e!lts to the individual, to increase the likelihood that a sufficient number of mdlvlduals will support the programme by enrolling in it.
(3) The 1978 Year 4 allowance is $3,500 against the scheme's proposed $4,870-an increase of $1,370.
There is little meaning in studying the five year teacher education programme in vacuo, since through the eyes of all parties it will be seen as an alternative to the existing programs, viz the four year degree-diploma program of universities (4) and the three year diploma of teaching program at colleges of advanced education. For simplicity, all programs will be viewed as 'packages' which are commenced from the first year of tertiary study. While it could be argued that the end-on diploma of education and post-graduate bachelor of education could be entered at the completion of the first degree, the constraints of teaching subject requirements set by employing authorities mean that in fact the student must make some commitment to an intended teaching career at quite an early stage of his primary degree program.
Our procedure is to take each program in turn and relate the expected additional costs to be incurred, with the expected stream of additional benefits which will result over the working lifetime of the graduate. Since we have postulated that each program is to be taken as a package, the critical time of choice between programs is the time at which a matriculant makes his initial enrolment.
For the purposes of our comparative study of incremental benefits and costs, therefore, we shall consider the case of a bright, ambitious matriculant from a poor family. Without further study he could obtain a job readily but he is seriously considering a teaching career. He knows he would have little trouble in graduating in minimum time. He wants to ensure that he receives reasonably rapid career advancement and its accompanying financial return to justify his sacrifices while training.
There are three teacher training paths from which he can choose: (i) five years of university training which will yield a double degree (which includes a post-graduate education degree). (ii) four years of university training, which will give him a degree and diploma (iii) three years of training at a college of advanced education, which will result in a Diploma of Teaching.
We assume that alternatives (i) and (ii) would lead him into secondary teaching and (iii) into a career in primary school teaching. He has learnt from his career advisory officer the approximate number of years it would take him to reach particular promotional positions if he entered the banking field immediately or gained teacher registration under each of the above three options. In particular, he is advised that since the major criterion for the placement of a graduate teacher on a promotions list is years of service, the additional post-graduate qualification gained from option (i) is unlikely to advance his prospects of early promotion by any more than one year, compared with his possessing a degree-diploma qualification.
He knows that if he chooses option (i) he will receive a TEAS living-at-home allowance while he studies for his undergraduate degree, then for the intern year and for the final year of university study, he will receive half the first year (4) From the point of view of pecuniary costs and benefits, it is immaterial whether the diploma is obtained as a concurrent or an end-on qualification. 6 teacher's salary. If he chooses either option (ii) or (iii) he expects to receive a teacher education living-at-home scholarship for the duration of the programme.
We shall consider this case from two decisional frames of reference-from the student's own perspective, in order to assess the relative attractiveness of each option to him and his family, and from the societal perspective, in order to consider the extent to which each appears to justify the commitment of society's resources. Societal costs and benefits include those borne and received by the student and the rest of society-the latter being represented by the Commonwealth and State Governments. On the (heroic) assumption that salary payments reflect with some accuracy the worker's social contribution (Le. that the worker is 'paid what he's worth') we take annual gross earning of a teacher to truly reflect the social value of his teaching services in that year.
Likewise we take as social cost of a full-time student's study, the gross earnings he could have earnt if he was in full-time remuneration work, commensurate with his current educational achievements.
The private individual is untroubled by any assumed connection between his earnings and his social contribution-he is concerned with how much is, or could be, in his own pay packet. From a private viewpoint, therefore, we consider the person's potell,~ial or actual income after the deduction of income taxation.
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With any evaluation of future educational alternatives the problem of differing time streams of costs and benefits must be faced. The costs of our options are borne over three, four or five years. The benefits are assumed to begin in the fourth, fifth or sixth year and to extend to the forty sixth year, assuming the teacher works until age sixty-five. Before we can compare an expected cost in say 1980 AD with an expected benefit in 2025 AD, we must bring both to the common time base of the present. (We therefore call these 'present values'). This we do by the method of time discounting-which is essentially an inverted form of compound interest. There is no 'right' rate of time discounting which should be used. The rate considered by the decision maker to be appropriate depends on two main factors-la) the uncertainties that future events will occur and (b) the 'time preference' of the decision maker Le. the different importance a person gives to a particular cost or benefit occuring in the immediate, compared with the more distant, future.
Because society can 'spread its risks' more easily than can individuals, (a) is a less important consideration from a social than from a private perspective. Thus social discount rates are generally lower than private rates. But since the analyst has no prior right to state what the 'proper' social or private rate of time discount should be, benefit-cost estimates are usually made using a range of rates, enabling the decision maker to pay most attention to those estimates calculated using what he believes to be the most appropriate rate. In the analysis below we have presented social benefit-cost ratios using discount rates from one to eight percent, and private ratios using rate of three, six, nine and twelve percent.
There is one final point in this introduction to the benefit-cost analysis, concerning the 'baseline' used for the calculation of the ratios. In our case study, the prior choice facing the matriculant is whether or not he should undertake any-tertiary study at all. He already possesses educational qualifications equal to most young people of his age. If employment opportunities exist he could find work immediately. From his private perspective while further study promises higher earnings after completion of his teacher training, the training itself will incur considerable sacrifices of forgone earnings and financial outlays. Will the present values of these future additional (incremental) earnings exceed the present values of the expected extra (incremental) costs of each study option? Similarly, from the social perspective: while the worker's productivity is likely to be enhanced by tertiary education, considerable production potential will be lost by the person not being in productive work during his training. Will the present value of the worker's additional productivity over his working life exceed the present value of production forgone, allowances given, and additional educational resources absorbed during each of the teacher training programme options? To answer both sets of questions, we compare the cost and subsequent earnings profiles expected from each of the programme options, with an estimate of the possible lifetime earnings profile of the matriculant if he entered the workforce directly from school.
Private Benefit-Cost Ratios of Teacher Education Options
Appendices 1-3 show the detailed benefit-cost calculations of each of the three options (i), (ii) and (iii) introduced earlier. Each seeks to represent the probable events in every year of the matriculant's subsequent career, then to compare his net (after tax) salary for that year (columns 1-3)(5) with his net wage if he had undertaken no further study (columns 4-6)(6).
Column 7 shows the difference between these two income streams for each year. The negative incomes (earnings forgone) during the teacher preparation years represent the costs of each option; the positive incomes after appointment as a teacher represent the option's benefits. Before the agespecific negative or positive incomes are aggregated each is discounted to derive a net present value, (in these appendices a discount rate of 12% is used) the benefit-cost ratio is simply the ratio of the aggregate of the net present values of the positive incomes (the benefits) to the aggregate of the net present values of the negative incomes (the costs).
Before we present the final benefit-cost ratios for each option using various discount rates, it might help clarify the exercise if the mathematical results of (5) During teacher training, column 1 data represent the value of the student's teacher education scholarship for options (i) and (iii) and years 4 and 5 of option (i) The most striking feature of the graph is the extent to which time discounting diminishes the present values of earnings expected to be received in the more distant future. Although a principal's age-specific salary is very much larger than that of the matriculant worker, the time at which the principal's position is expected to be reached is so far into the future, that the differential makes a quite modest contribution to aggregate benefits. Table 2 and its accompanying Graph 2 present an array of benefit-cost ratios from the perspective of the individual. Comparisons are made between ratios appropriate to a selected time discount rate. As mentioned earlier, the individual who pays most attention to his incomes and outgoes in the shorter term future would compare the ratios calculated with a higher discount rate: the person who takes a longer term view and considers his incremental earnings later in his career almost as highly as those in his early career would pay most attention to the ratios which use a low discount rate.
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The higher the discount rate, the lower the benefit-cost ratios because (as Graph 2 shows) of the smaller benefits from incremental earnings in the more distant future. Nevertheless, all three options are acceptable investments for the individual at even the high rates of discount, since benefits exceed costs (B/C'::>1).
More significant for our purposes is the comparison between options. As the double degree program (Option 1) has the lowest benefit-cost ratio of the three programmes for every time discount rate. m This suggests that under the proposed conditions of student allowances and promotional criteria, the proposed teacher education programme which includes a one year internship will be less attractive than either of the two present programmes, to a bright matriculant who pays attention to the effects of his programme of studies on his later career earnings. It should be recognized that although the relative ratios diverge somewhat at higher discount rates, the difference between them is never very great.
We can say, therefore, that even if the matriculant is aware of, and pays heed to results such as these, he is unlikely to let them outweigh other nonpecuniary implications of choosing one or other of the options. Put differently, other non-pecuniary benefits which the student expects to obtain from choosing to take option 1 might offset its relatively adverse benefit-cost ratio, to make it the most desirable option of the three.
(7) While it is not central to our current exercise, a comparison of options (ii) and (iii) is interesting. While the career opportunities of a secondary teacher with a degree and diploma of education are greater that those of a primary teacher with a three year Diploma of Education, the costs of the former are higher, thus a career-oriented matriculant (with a low discount rate) is likely to find the longer tertiary programme preferable. Someone who has a shorter time horizon would find no basis for deciding between these programmes on pecuniary grounds. 10 , ' . 
Social Benefit-Cost Ratios
The main difference between the basis of social and the private benefit-cost calculations is that the former takes a production rather than an income orientation. That is, the society is not so interested in how much a worker might receive, as the value of what he might contribute to society. In public service activities such as education, it is extremely difficult to obtain an unambiguous estimate of the value of the social contribution of a worker's services. As we mentioned earlier the best approximate value of this contribution is the gross salary the government employing authority is prepared to pay the worker. ISI By this reasoning, the income tax paid from gross salary is irrelevant, for it affects only the distribution of the fruits of the worker's production: the higher the proportion of salary paid in taxation, the greater the share of the fruits of the worker's production which others ('the society') receive. From the same social perspective, the costs of a student's full-time study are taken to be the actual and imputed outlays of the educational institution, plus the gross earnings forgone by his not working. The magnitude of any student allowance is irrelevant, for the same reason that income tax payment is irrelevant-it affects only the distribution of the social cost.
Appendix 4 details the estimated annual social costs of each of the teacher education options. The stream of social benefits expected to flow from each option is taken to be the difference between gross teacher salary (column 1) and gross matriculant wage (column 4) in the relevant appendix. Both costs and benefits are discounted at 1,2,4 and 6 percent, to yield the social benefitcost ratios reported below in Table 2 .
As expected, the social benefit-cost ratios of all options are less than the private ratios for any given discount rate. Nevertheless, all benefit-cost ratios still exceed unity: that is, the present value of the stream of social benefits (as measured by incremental gross earnings) still exceed the discounted social costs of the teacher education programmes. This suggests that all three options are worthwhile social investments, despite their costs.
The relative social benefit-cost ratios at each discount rate are similar to those found for the private benefit-cost ratios. The five-year double-degree teacher education programme consistently has less favourable ratios than the other options for all time discount rates considered. The higher the discount rate the slightly more favourable is the ratio of option (i) compared with option (ii). This is because the higher gross earnings later in the teacher's working life become more heavily discounted than the higher costs of the five-year teacher education programme.
Particularly significant is the fact that there is a difference in the dispersion between the social and the private benefit-cost ratios. Table 4 demonstrates that at the low three percent discount rate the private benefit-cost ratio of option (i) is 6-13 percent less than those of the other options, whereas the social ratio of option (i) is 26-34% less than those of the others. Thus from a (8) Age-specific salaries are primarily the result of industrial agreements in which seniority rather than merit or productivity is the major determinant.
12 social viewpoint this analysis suggests it will be difficult to argue the case that educational and other non-financial benefits which the internship scheme claims to generate, will be large enough to offset these adverse benefit-cost ratios and to justify the programme's implementation. (c) Production forgone assumes that undergraduate students lose 40 weeks' work at an annual (48 week) gross wage equal to the matriculant worker. Degree-holders not in the workforce are assumed to forgo production valued at the annual salary of a two-year trained assistant teacher.
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